














Lessons from IDRC evaluations on Competitive Grants: 
 





























This document, prepared for the IDRC Evaluation Unit, is based on a review of five 
recent studies commissioned by IDRC on small grants programmes, the earliest of these 
completed April 2005 and the latest February 2006.  Toward IDRC’s consideration of 
future small grants programmes, the objectives of this present meta-review are: 
- to consider the similarities, and any contradictions, in the findings from the five 
studies; and 
- to suggest lessons that might be learned on the basis of these. 
 
Nature of the Data 
The five studies1 reviewed were looking at quite different types of grants programmes, 
and for different purposes. They did not use a standard analytical approach, nor did they 
use a specific analytical framework. Thus, they did not all deal with the same issues, or 
address any one issue in the same way or with the same level/type of analysis.  
 
While these factors limited somewhat the extent to which their findings could be 
compared, it was nonetheless instructive that – to a large extent -- their analyses and 
conclusions did in fact compare. Applying the same question to each study “what worked 
for whom and in what context?”, in fact produced many of the same generic – and so 
reasonably generalizable -- answers. The main question for IDRC arising from this 
present review is, then, perhaps not what lessons are there to be learned, but why they 
are proving difficult to apply? An attempt is made to begin answering that question in the 
next section.  
 
Organization of the Review 
This review is divided into two main parts: (i) a discussion of the key findings that were 
common to all five of the grants programme studies and, therefore, can probably be 
assumed as the “lessons” of all such arrangements; and (ii) a more detailed presentation 
                                               
1 A summary of the main design, results and analysis of “what worked, what did not and what are 
the lessons” for each of the five studies is attached as an annex.  
Please note: throughout this report, the author refers to “small grant programs” – in 
IDRC terminology, this should be understood as “competitive grant projects”. 
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of the specific findings/lessons identified under four core themes2: management, 
capacity development, policy and use, and networking.   
 
(i) Common Findings/Lessons 
The following points are based on data from the studies, though reflect wider experience 
of grants generally. They are also interactive, all related to two main characteristics of 
small grants arrangements: that they are essentially research and capacity learning 
systems; and they succeed to the extent that their complexity and fragility as such are 
recognized and accounted for. All of the grants programmes included in the five studies 
succeeded “to a degree”; they worked more or less well along the same dimensions.  
   
a) Within the context of IDRC as a research for development agency, small grants 
programmes can, and will, never be the straightforward arrangements they are often 
expected to be. They are always going to be labour-intensive to manage whoever does 
it; expensive to implement in time, money and intellectual energy; and more effective 
where they are grounded in some wider institutional or programmatic framework.  
Because they are intended ultimately to generate capacities and knowledge that 
contribute both substantively and sustainably to the research, policy and/or development 
agenda of individuals, institutions, governance systems or development sectors – and 
typically to more than one of these -- they are never “simple”.  
 Grants programmes need to recognize the scope and implications of these realities at 
the outset, and be reflected in decisions about their design, management, resources and 
linkages to policy/practice. Further, and critically, they need to be explicitly and directly 
set within the wider corporate and programmatic agenda of IDRC, as a main and 
legitimate  “beneficiary”. Without both of these criteria being met, grants programmes are 
inevitably limited in impact and eventually orphaned, conceptually if not practically. 3 
 
b) Contrary to how they are often treated, small grants programmes are not inherently 
self-sustaining. Grants programmes are not intended as the core of IDRC’s normal 
activities, but rather to complement, extend or reinforce those activities. IDRC is neither 
                                               
2 These themes are “core” both because they appeared as issues in all five studies and because 
they are of continuing concern to IDRC.  
3 Even for completely stand-alone contracted programmes, IDRC’s reputation is a major in-kind 
contribution and should expect to advance, and be advanced by, the exercise. 
 








a granting institution (a la SSHRC) nor a university. For this reason, grants programmes 
operated through or by the Centre are usually a series of fairly light-handed individual 
learning events strung together as transitory and nonformal arrangements. Their 
success, therefore, is dependent directly on those involved at each point in the decision-
action chain: on their level of commitment, interest and capacities (as funders, 
managers, resources/advisers, awardees); and on the level of responsibility each 
accepts to initiate, monitor and interact around activities. 
  Grants programmes need to avoid falling foul of the unwarranted, though often 
unexpressed, expectation that once approved events will continue to unfold on their own 
and as planned. Unfortunately, not everyone will be equally motivated, able or have time 
to be proactive, to maintain regular communication, to offer mentoring. The “extra work” 
required is unlikely to be as “marginal” as initially assumed. A grants programme is 
effective to the extent it is not left to “happen”, without specific systems and resources in 
place to push it along.  
 
c) Small grants programmes regularly struggle under the weight of too many and too 
substantial “intended outcomes” resting on a too fragile base. More often perhaps a 
function of enthusiastic marketing rather than explicit design, grants programme 
descriptors suggest they “will do it all”: generate new knowledge, confirm novel research 
themes, establish research-policy networks, consolidate institutions, create a sustainable 
research culture. However, grants programmes are what they are: loosely-coupled 
arrangements, providing relatively few material resources and fewer technical inputs, 
over a usually short time horizon, to a relatively few people unconnected to IDRC or to 
each other in any reinforcing way.  
 The problem is less that these programmes rarely realize these goals, than that they 
can dissipate focus in aiming vaguely at too many targets without sufficient attention to 
any one. By setting the bar too high, these over-expectations tend often to produce 
either overly negative reports of “missed” results; or overly positive ones full of 
unsubstantiated “satisfaction” statements. Neither situation assesses the programme 
fairly on the basis of what it could and did do. 
 
d) Small grants programmes fall short or collapse as development interventions because 
they are too ‘light-handed’ in conforming to “best practice” development and 
management standards, and learning principles. In IDRC, where they are second-tier 








tasks, grants programmes tend not to get the same level of relevant professional 
attention that goes into research projects. Criteria often not comprehensively or 
rigorously addressed includes: relevance to development, research and capacity 
priorities of all stakeholders; appropriateness to policy, programme and institutional 
goals; clarity and agreement on goals, roles and resource commitments; congruence, 
coherence and consistency of design, methods, resources and their link to expected 
outcomes.        
 Like any “system” of interacting inputs, actions, actors and outcomes, it is important to 
get the logic right; to answer the critical questions of any development intervention:  
- What exactly is it really going to achieve?  
- Is this what all of those involved and responsible want?  
- Is everyone prepared to make the necessary contributions (invariably more than 
what is expected or resourced)?  
- Do all the elements hang together – is there appropriate and adequate input to 
match every expected output?  
- On what basis will it be declared “finished”? 
This last one is an especially tricky question given all those “weighty expectations”.    
 
 
b) Thematic Findings/Lessons  
The following synthesis of findings comes directly out of the five studies, though not all 
dealt with all of them, analyzed them in detail or presented definitive “lessons learned” 
conclusions.    
 
1. Management of Grants Programmes 
The management of small grants programmes are invariably complicated by the facts of 
multiple actors, only occasionally in direct contact, with often unclear or competing 
agendas; a multi-faceted task environment of funds administration, awardee selection, 
maintenance and programme support, resource person mobilization etc; and, for various 
reasons, a typically tenuous human and financial resource base. 
 
Management arrangements that appear to work: 
 Clarifying and establishing agreement with all management/funding collaborators 
with respect to the rationale, priorities and “bottom-line” expectations of the 








programme; confirming that these are consistent with their respective organizational 
goals and mandates; identifying the systems and processes in each agency that will 
ground the programme in their policy, programming and budgets with respect to 
grant oversight, adaptation and termination. Overarching all of this, determining if 
collaborators are “partners” or “contractors” and the implications for management 
relations of either. 
 
 Basing the programme in an established institution with proven record as manager of 
multi-dimensional, loosely-coupled outreach programmes; flexible, responsive and 
transparent administrative systems; and competent staff with dedicated time for the 
programme, not expected to “fold it into” other work.  
 
 Enabling IDRC to provide this kind of base itself, bringing to bear the critical “value-
added” dimensions of professional reputation, technical input to the selection 
processes, links to its networks and mentored monitoring oversight, IF senior 
management explicitly articulates an institutionally relevant rationale for housing the 
programme; supports the design and administration of the arrangement through 
dedicated grants management expertise and pre-arranged, acknowledged time-
allocations of research officers.  
 
 Promoting ownership of, and expectations of benefit from, the grants programme in 
Centre-administered arrangements by engaging all key management and 
professional officers in ways which encourage and reward linking it as complement 
to other aspects of their work, open communication about problems and successes, 
risk-taking and innovative thinking. 
 
 Ensuring a selection and review process that is professionally credible, technically 
competent, contextually relevant and transparent - through the use of recognised 
international experts for selection and review processes, whether the programme is 
internally or externally managed and whether it is competitive or invitational.  
 
 Finding a “just right” balance in terms of meeting the objectives of the programme in 
bringing in the appropriate candidates and adding value to the exercise by serving as 
an exposure-cum-learning exercise (e.g. project development workshops), while not 








overweighting the front-end in terms of time, money and good will of resource 
persons.  
 
 Designing the programme around and in the context of available and tested 
institutions, systems and resources (financial, technical, partnerships); in ways that 
build on and reinforce proven practice and piggy-back services/networks already 
available through, for example, IDRC regional offices; and in regions rather than 
countries or globally toward balancing potentials for reach, diversity, complementarity 
and exchange.  
 
 Acknowledging, respecting and accommodating the value-added and in-kind costs of 
the external “experts” contributing to the grants programme, by limiting the size and 
scope of tasks to fit actual needs and promote double-tasking, keeping review and 
application processes user-friendly, providing clear and reasonable terms of 
reference, welcoming feedback.   
 
Management arrangements that are problematic: 
 
 Not being explicit, honest and modest about the place of the grants programme in 
the wider life of the collaborating donor/management organizations, especially for 
IDRC, as it balances its corporate stability (e.g. good policy/public relations in 
Canada) and research for development agenda (e.g. responsibility and commitment 
to Southern researchers)  and, in consequence, taking on too much, with overly 
vague conditions, and failing to put the appropriate safeguards and resources in 
place.  
   
 Underestimating the labour intensive, professionally demanding and typically 
uncertain nature of grants programmes that invariably must juggle and hold together 
a complex mix of development agenda, institutional priorities, personal attributes and 
professional capacities  and, in consequence, failing to put the support systems, 
resources and skills sets in place to facilitate, sustain and reward competent, 
consistent management action. 
 








 Outsourcing management responsibility to untested, marginally capable 
organizations, without sufficient institutional assessment to ensure appropriateness 
of prevailing policies and capacities; shared understanding of the task and strategies; 
and fiscal, technical and administrative probity  and, in consequence, requiring as 
much labour-intensive management and policy work by IDRC staff as for Centre-
managed programmes, but without direct control over the quality or results of 
programme delivery. 
 
 Allowing ambiguous designation of grant purpose, scope, level of commitment to 
roles and resources in co-developed and managed programmes; and failing to put in 
place clearly agreed and resourced systems for goal clarification, negotiation and 
arbitration  and, in consequence,  laying the foundation for management and 
political dysfunction and potential agreement breakdown. 
 
 Failing to ensure a coherent and comprehensive “logical model” that connects the 
dots of inputs, material resources and expected outcomes  and, in consequence, 
under-resourcing in human, financial and infrastructure terms the core elements of 
the grants programme e.g. cost-effective, technically oriented selection processes, 
timely and relevant advisory support, opportunities for peer interaction, mentored and 
systematic monitoring. 
 
 Failing to match the grants mechanism to the situation and/or needs of the 
research/capacity task, the prospective awardees, and the wider beneficiary/user 
community  and, in consequence, creating a management-heavy, cost-ineffective 
arrangement, overweighting resources on procedures and control systems at the 
expense of content quality, usable outcomes and forward looking adaptation.  
 
 
2. Capacity development 
That small grants programmes will develop the capacity of awardees in some way is a 
“given”, in theory. Even grants for senior researchers, where the objectives focus on 
knowledge generation, network building or policy impact, enhanced capacity for doing 
such things is implied. Grants programmes are typically “most beneficial” where they 
“helped me learn”. Unfortunately, capacity development is also a “given” in practice, 








expected to happen without necessarily bringing together the elements necessary to 
enable it.   
 
Capacity building arrangements that appear to work: 
 
 Conceiving the overall design of the grants programme and all of the elements within 
it in terms of their implications for facilitating or impeding learning, including: 
- being precise as to what the learning outcomes are expected to be and for 
whom; 
- as much as possible, designing all major grants stages as interactive and 
facilitated learning events e.g. introductory orientation or project development 
seminars enabling applicants/awardees to understand, exchange or confirm 
expectations, new concepts, ways to improve research methodologies etc, deal 
with data design; stock-taking workshops among awardees, with advisors and/or 
the referent community (e.g. policy-makers expected to use the results). 
- asking of each expected capacity outcome:  
- Who will have to learn what?  
- Through what means?  
- How will that learning be consolidated?  
- What will indicate it’s happening?  
- Are the resources in place for facilitating it appropriate i.e. not just 
knowledge content expertise, but also knowledge of how people learn and 
skills in mentoring?  
 
 Focusing on people/awardees already in a learning mode e.g. graduate students, 
young research associated with a new IDRC project/programme, senior researchers 
struggling to shift their analyses to a next level (of policy, intervention practice, 
multidisciplinary design). Readiness is a key factor in learning; a grants programme 
is more cost-effective and internally sustained by engaging motivated people with 
clear learning goals and negotiating its priorities in terms of theirs.  
 
 Recognizing that people do not learn what they do not have the opportunity to 
engage with, and ensuring those opportunities are in place:  








- the simple chance to do field research and reflect with others on the experience 
was perhaps the major contributor to individual capacity development for young 
researchers; to have a system of regular exchange to test ideas for more senior 
ones.  
- individual grants, implemented in isolation, do not develop institutions or produce 
networks; if these are the goals, there needs to be sufficient and relevant means 
for getting there - of extending the learning, integrating it into policies and 
practices, experiencing the processes and learning the skills of negotiating, 
communicating and aligning agendas.    
 
Capacity building arrangements that are problematic: 
 Not linking the grant conceptually or practically into IDRC’s wider agenda, either as 
project, programme of institution development (to use an old, but still valid, capacity 
framework)  and, in consequence, limiting the likelihood of a sufficiently holistic 
frame of reference to warrant sufficiently extensive time and resources to, for 
example: 
- differentiate researcher learning needs (experienced versus novice, research 
skills versus knowledge generation) and tailor programmes in design (e.g. 
including pre-selection mentoring or concept formulation workshops), content, 
duration and resource inputs to these 
- include time and resources for pre- and post-project planning and follow-up 
- generate comprehensive results dissemination strategies,  
- build opportunities for value-added links back into IDRC for researchers 
themselves, their knowledge products, their continued professional 
development e.g. associating them with other Centre activities, networks. 
 
 Providing insufficient resources of money, time and compensatory professional 
benefit for those who hold the learning substance and processes of the grant 
together - reviewers, advisors, IDRC officers  and, in consequence, limiting their 
ability and, perhaps, motivation to provide mentoring commentary on proposals, 
facilitative evaluation feedback to applicants/awardees, ideas and support for 
integrating or extending the experience. 
 








 Over-estimating the speed, linearity and uni-dimensionality of organizational 
learning, institution building or policy systems change and the extent to which these 
complex goals can be realized through the typically light-handed mechanism of a 
grants programme  and, in consequence, not building in the necessary connectors 
between the individual and the organization/system; making grants too short in 




3.  Policy Influence and Utilisation 
Influence and utilization issues are problematic in small grants arrangements for several 
reasons: because they plan for/claim to do more than is reasonable for what they are; 
because even the reasonably expected outcomes are rarely defined in outcomes terms 
at the level of the programme (individual awardees no doubt know what s/e expects to 
learn from and do with the experience); and because they are not expressly planned to 
ensure that utilization ends are matched with the means of achieving them. 
 
Policy and utilization arrangements that seem to work: 
 
 Clarity within IDRC as to why and how it’s engaging in a small grants programme 
mechanism will enable moving forward its corporate mandate and programming 
goals, on both general and specific terms, and whether as manager or overseer; and 
thereby being able to frame design and resource decisions in expressly policy and 
utilization terms: to seek and agree on collaborations that are use-oriented, map 
progress outcomes in terms of policy/use “expect to see”; adapt, reconfigure and add 
phases that allow for progressive policy and utilization-focused action. Noting, for 
example, that  
- targeted themes selected by IDRC to match changing regional policy priorities 
appear to have a better chance of leading to some policy infuence; 
- targeted commissioned studies appear to have more chance of policy influence 
than projects selected through competition. 
- planning for use through association with/integration into on-going IDRC 
programmes and networks facilitates application of new skills and knowledge in 
reasonably cost-effective ways benefiting both awardee and the Centre 









Policy and utilization arrangements that are problematic: 
 
 Thinking in the short-term and expecting links into policy and practice to happen  
and, in consequence,  
- devising research competition themes without sufficient reference to “why and 
where next”, the step-wise progression of research application and policy 
change processes and thus the limited utility of shifting focal areas too quickly 
(e.g. in less than 2-3 years)  
- providing insufficient time or resources for post-project dissemination of results 
through conferences, publication, or contact with community stakeholders,  
- not including development of skills and knowledge expressly geared to 
implementation or application of results 
- failing to provide support for laboratories, databases, libraries and other 
support services, including technical troubleshooting, to encourage 




Across the five studies, creating networks was not a well-realized outcome of the small 
grants programmes reviewed. The problem with the concept of a network is that its 
meaning, structures and functions, and expected impacts are typically too vague: grants 
programmes refer to “networking” as the both the process and  mechanism for 
implementation, and as an outcome of that implementation - awardees will network to 
learn and become a network in consequence. While both of these expectations might be 
accurate and effective, the five studies suggest they are neither.  
 
Networking arrangements that seem to work: 
   
 Proactively bringing awardees together in a facilitated, purposive activity that will 
establish linkages on the basis of professional exchange, value-added for one’s own 
work and, importantly, recognizing IDRC’s commitment to the grant as a learning and 
research “whole” that is greater than the individual parts -- while not ensuring a 
network relationship evolves, will provide the space for that potential. 









 Designing and managing collaborative multi-donor grant programmes that, from the 
outset, promote, enable and build networking as the modus operandi of the 
programme – with clearly agreed roles, mandates, resources and responsibilities for 
implementation, monitoring and progressive adaptation.  
 
 Providing awardees the “hooks” on which to evolve a network relationship  
- regular opportunities for dialogue;  
- core materials available on an interactive website;   
- helping identify or create common activity threads among awardees (testing 
novel research methods or analytical frameworks, encouraging development of 
data collection or analysis tools);  
- encouraging and facilitating (through financing) meetings outside the programme. 
- facilitating links with existing research centres, training institutions, networks to 
which awardees separately or jointly can affiliate.   
- locating the competition or coordination in some permanent structure (such as a 
regional association or regional institution) to encourage post-project networking. 
- building in mechanisms within IDRC to maintain contact with new organizations 
introduced to the Centre through the grants competition, even when they do not 
receive immediate support. 
 
Networking arrangements that are problematic: 
 
 Not being clear about the “why and how” of the networking idea  and, in 
consequence,  
- failing to ensure that it is more than simply a rhetorical substitute for the 
programme itself putting all the pieces in place in terms of grant implementation 
and results utilization e.g. ‘let the network do it” ; 
- selecting designs or methods likely to impede networking from occurring e.g. 
competitive selection scattered over wide geographic, topic or capacity ranges 
that provide no common platform for interaction; 
- under-resourcing the minimal conditions of a network – funding and infrastructure 
for regular and face-to-face communication, joint action, explicit financial support 
for coordination;  








- failing to follow-up activities of the grant programme in ways that promote 
informal sharing and collaboration as the seed of future networks and options for 


















Study:  Advanced Education and Training Options Available to IDRC 
  Prepared for Special Initiatives Division, IDRC 
 
Author: George Tillman Consulting 





This study is a review of training programmes operated by a large number of donors, 
and of lessons from these programmes which might be applicable to IDRC. It also traces 
the evolution of training within IDRC over the last 25 years. 
 
The bulk of the material for the study came from written documents, supplemented by 
ten interviews. 
 
What worked:   
 
This study provides  analysis of the effectiveness of only a few of the  individual 
programmes it lists, but the following are interesting: 
 
 A CIDA-funded project: Early Childhood Development Virtual University Masters 
degree programme, liked the University of Victoria with a number of Sub-Saharan 





o Use of flexible curricula permitting incorporation of local knowledge 
and practice, can help produce sustainable training results. 
o Internal country networks appear to have been more successful than 
international networks. 
o Long-term support is viewed as necessary, but is not currently 
available. 
o Orientation seminars are useful before training. 
o Transparent selection processes are important for credibility. 
o Expert advisory committees are useful. 
o Future programmes should build on the base of trained cohorts. 
o More dissemination of participants’ products would be useful.  
 
 The UK Wellcome Trust Population Studies Programme includes both a training 
course and support for a research project in the home country.  The course was 
rated higher than the research, because of a lack of field support during research. 
[p. 15] 
 








 The Ford Foundation International Fellowship Programme focuses masters and 
doctoral training support on women, and ethnic racial or religious groups that have 
been marginalised or which are in conflict or post-conflict situations.  
 
o The programme includes preparatory training in language, computer skills 
and research methods.  
 
o The programme specifically is not targeted at institutional development, 
but at helping innovative individuals such as community activists in civil 
society.  [p. 16] 
 
 The John D. Rockefeller 3rd Scholars Program focuses on Asian capacity for 
regional collaboration in policy-oriented research. 
 
o Significantly, the programme appears to focus on field support, providing 
an “eminent mentor” for research teams, and money for research 
assistants. 
 
 A 2003 evaluation of the UNDP/UNFPA/WHO/World Bank Special Programme of 
Research Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction said that 
the programme created research capacity but criticised monitoring of research 
institution capacity and performance. 
 
 Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom’s distance learning 
scholarships for post-graduate courses with partnerships between UK and 
overseas providers – permit people to maintain employment while being trained. [p. 
10] 
 
 SIDA programmes “aim to help universities gain credibility for managing 
governmental funds for basic research facilities, and become able to extract 
external funding from the private sector, from foreign donors and from foundations.” 
[p. 11]  No details provided. 
 
 The French “Bourses d’Insertion de Jeunes chercheurs and Bourses post-
doctorales, aim to integrate younger researchers into research teams” already 
supported by other French sources. [p. 14] 
 
 A 1997 report on networks in sub-Saharan Africa cited the importance of 
knowledge networks, rather than information networks, and particularly the 
importance of providing “a critical mass of peer review not available at the national 
level” to sustain learning. [p. 21] 
 
 University Science, Humanities and Engineering Partnerships in Africa encountered 
a number of problems related to division of labour among joint supervisors, 





 Managing advanced education and training is very labour intensive. 
 








 Donor interpretation of their own mandates may differ and this can cause problems 
for recipient institutions. 
 
o “This causes confusion and administrative burdens for the recipient 
institutions. Organizations need to examine how their support to training 
relates to and affects not only the recipients but also the activities of other 
donors.”  [p. 31] 
 
o IDRC should therefore consider how to coordinate support with other 
donors. [p. 41] 
 
 Funding for laboratories, databases, libraries and other support services including 
technical troubleshooting, should be included in support for research capacity 
development. 
 
 Support for training should be based in a clear understanding of an organization’s 
core mandate.   
 
o IDRC’s support for training grew iteratively, not from specific policy 
guidelines “or a clear articulation of the Centre’s principles and 
objectives concerning training”. [p. 34, 38] 
 
 Several examples of successful training in Programme 
Initiatives projects focused on work with stakeholders at the 
community level or on people who did not intend to become 
professional researchers [p. 37-39] 
 
o Some other donors have rooted their training programmes in  reviews 
of previous experience, and outline how they see training contributing 
to capacity development.  
 




o IDRC should clarify its training policy. 
 
 Situating the wide range of IDRC training initiatives within a network context 
would be useful. 
 
 IDRC should continue to expand  CT-supported learning programmes 
including research on the effectiveness of this approach for post-graduate 
training. 








Study:   Evaluation of “Central America in the World Economy of the 21st   
  Century”, Phase 1 and Phase 2 (103276) 
Prepared for the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Authors:  Fernando Loayza Careaga, Romulo Caballeros Otero 
Date:    August, 2005 




The Association for Research and Social Studies of Guatemala, was supported by IDRC 
to strengthen research and policy dialogue on economic integration. 
 
Four research competitions, over four years (Phase 1: February 2001-January 2003; 
Phase 2: October 2003-September 2005 – ongoing at time of the study). 
 
2. Basic objectives: 
 
a) Improved quality of research  
b) More policy debate on international economic issues 
c) Capacity development for researchers, policy makers, civil society on international 
trade issues. 
 
 Type of research capacity: 
 
• Conducting research 
• Conceiving, generating and sustaining research on international economic 
issues. 




 External:  The project was run, and funds managed by the Association for Research 
and Social Studies in Guatemala. 
 
 International advisory group. 
 
 Control of grants: Selection committee appointed by the Association. 
 




 Using an established institution to manage the project facilitated management of the 
project. 
 












b) Quality of research/debate 
 
 Mixing commissioned research studies by well-recognized specialists with 
competitions, improved the quality of the research and influence on policy. 
 
 Timing: The project was funded at a time when research was likely to have an impact 
on ongoing debates. 
 
c) Capacity development 
 
 Training for researchers on the substance of economic issues was well received by 
researchers from countries with “less developed” research capacity. 
 
 Workshops two months after commencement of research in round 2, improved 
quality of the studies by clarifying expectations, and making adjustments to projects. 
 
 




 Insufficient funds for the advisory group limited its ability to meet and have an 
impact. 
 
 Unclear TORs for the advisory group limited their impact on the project. 
 
 
 Competition between subregional research centres for grants, reduced networking 
between them. 
 
 Depending on other donors to deliver financial support for some components 
reduced continuity, when the support did not materialize. 
 
b) Quality of research 
 
 Positive discrimination to assist less developed institutions participate resulted in 
lower quality research.   
 
o Lesson:  To redress imbalances in competitions provide training and 
technical assistance (mentoring) complementary to the research topics [p. 
26].  “One can say that this type of support helps to avoid the false 
dilemma between building research capacities and promoting high-quality 
research.” [p. 16] 
 
c) Capacity development 
 
 No budget for reviewers limited their ability to provide capacity-development 
commentary on proposals. 
 
 Successful round 1 applicants were restricted from applying in round two, and this 
reduced sustained network and research capacity development. 









 Training: Researchers from more developed regional countries wanted more 
training on practical issues of research methods.  
 
 Training by other donors focused on substance, but did not contribute to research 
capacity development. 
 
 Small research grants and limited time available reduced the project’s capacity 
development results. 
 
o Lesson: Limit objectives to assured resources, and concentrate them on 
fewer grants over a longer period. 
 
o Lesson: Integrate training with research. 
  
d) Impact on policy/networking 
 
 Lack of a permanent structure limited sustainability of a network. 
 
 Insufficient or inappropriate (electronic) diffusion of research (both commissioned 
and competitive) reduced the impact on policy debates, reduced ownership by 
stakeholders in the project, and limited the creation of an effective research 
network. 
 
o Lesson: Provide opportunities for researchers to participate in international 
presentations of findings. 
 
o Lesson: Research  competitions are not suitable for influencing public debate. 








 Study:  Ecohealth Research Awards Program Tracer Study 
 
Author:  Jessica White 
Date:   January 2006 





The Ecohealth Research and Training Awards Programme supported 48 graduate 
student researchers in Canada and other countries, to do research on an Ecosystem 
Approach to Human Health between 1997 and the time of this study in 2005.  The 
programme provided a week of training at IDRC, up to $15,000 for research and in the 




The programme aimed to: 
 
 Build capacity among graduate students to use this approach in their research 
 
o Type of capacity:  Capacity to conduct research 
 




It is unclear from both the study and the IDRC web site, how this was managed.  It 
appears, from references to the time-consuming nature of followup, however that this 
was internally managed, with grants controlled by IDRC, but no further data is available. 
 
 




 Initial training on the subject at IDRC worked for 100% of the awardees.  This 
specifically helped them: 
 
o refine the research proposal  
o understand research methods 
o meet and form networks with other young researchers, IDRC staff  
 
 Readings, website and other materials helped some awardees. 
 
 The money provided was sufficient for most awardees. 
 
 Funding for participation in conferences helped some awardees in later phases of 
the programme. 
 








 Overall, the opportunity to do field work on the topic appeared to have substantial 













 There was some confusion about the basic concepts among awardees, supervisors 
and stakeholders.  Nevertheless, “increased knowledge and awareness of the 
ecohealth approach” and of research methods is cited as an important result. 
 
 Lack of field support and contact with IDRC staff. 
 
o Lesson: More mentoring by IDRC  staff  
o Such work is labour intensive and this give support to the idea of 
devolved management of the programme. 
 
 There was mixed feedback on the electronic web site: For some people internet 
access was expensive or rare, and this diminished utility of the web site, but for 
others it appeared useful. 
 
 Limited dissemination of research on a broad scale and to participating 




 There was a lack of followup on networking, to support researchers in the field. 
“The conference was great, but it was a one-time thing….There needs to be 
something that ties us together beyond the occasional conference” [p. 22]. 
 
o Nevertheless, this is contrasted with the finding that 92% of awardees  
maintained post-award contact with people they met during the 
programme. 
 




 There was no influence on policy, but the study provides no analysis of why. 
 
 Limited application to theses and dissertations. 
 
o Lesson: There should be more followup by IDRC staff to ensure delivery 
of specified outputs. 








 Study: RoKS Competitive Grants Program: Review and Recommendations 
 
Author:  Michael Graham 






The Research on Knowledge Systems Competitive Grants programme approved by the 
Board in 2001, was part of an effort to promote analysis and debate on how knowledge 
is produced and applied to development problems.  Other elements of this approach 
included supporting networks on knowledge systems, supporting capacity development 
and support for longer-term research based on themes identified in the competitive 
grants.  
 
Grants had a maximum value of $80,000 and duration was 12-18 months. 
 
This study, completed in 2006, is based on interviews with six IDRC programme staff 
and four grant administration staff, questionnaires completed by nine awardees and a 
review of documents.  The study intended to determine how effective the grants 
component was in reaching its objectives, and to review a number of questions related 




This study identifies four underlying purposes for the grants programme: [p. 4, 11, 39] 
 
 Identify promising researchers 
 Increase visibility for IDRC and its partners 
 Identify priorities for longer-term research and action. 
 Capacity development (unspecified level) 
 
The grants programme’s stated objectives were: 
 
 improving understanding of public-private patterns of support for research and  




The programme was internally managed by IDRC, and grants were approved and 
disbursed by IDRC. 
 
 




 Peer review workshops provided transparency in selection and gave technical 
credibility to the selection process. 
 















 New organizations were attracted to and became familiar with IDRC through the 
competition (but most were unsuccessful in the competition. [p. 42] 
 
o Lesson:  A separate component for junior researchers may give them 
more opportunity. 
 
 Electronic announcements were effective in reaching prospective applicants. [ p. 29] 
 





 Because yearly competitions were focused on specific themes of importance, some, 
but not all, of the research had an impact on research policy. [p.34-35] 
 




 The peer review process was too wide (up to ten people) and took too much time. 
 
 Applicants, however, wanted more detailed evaluation feedback on their 
proposals. 
 
o Lesson:  Fewer people should review proposals, but give more in-
depth feedback to applicants on technical issues in their proposals. 
 
 The original application form was too complicated [p. 9], originally 22 pages [p. 20].  
This was changed to an 8-page concept note followed by a more detailed application 
and full proposal for shortlisted candidates in round 2.  Even the short concept note 
was too demanding, and technically difficult to use according to the study [p. 30]. 
 
 The simultaneous review and approval of all awards (6-9) makes obtaining financial 
clearances  difficult. [p. 44-45] Delays for one or two projects can cause down-
stream delays in coordinating networking and reporting for projects. More attention 
needs to be paid to financial elements during the peer review workshops as part of 
the selection process.  This will reduce problems with financial administration later.  
Second and third round approvals were faster because of this involvement. 
 
o Lesson: Involve Grants and Administration staff from the beginning of 
a competition, to make clear to programme staff and applicants, what 
the approval process entails. 
 








 Ambiguous definitions of responsibility within IDRC for technical and financial 
monitoring caused confusion for awardees. 
 





 Networks were not successful. Awardees could not identify common interests 
because of diverse geographic and substantive differences in their work although 
they thought this was their fault, not IDRC’s. [p. 34, 37, 43] 
 
o Lesson:  Increase regionalisation of  the competitions to provide some 
basis of common interest for networking. [p. 31, 39] 
 
o Lesson: Link grantees to existing networks rather than starting new 
ones. 
 
o Lesson: Encourage joint projects between several country teams. 
 




 Most “new” organizations introduced to IDRC through the competition were not 
successful, and no contact was maintained with them subsequently (because of 




 Short duration of the awards did not facilitate any capacity development beyond the 
individual, to the institution.  This seems similar to conclusions of two 1985 studies 
on IDRC small grants. [p. 16, 41] 
 




 Themes changed too quickly. 
 
o Lesson:  More time should be allocated to a theme (two years) to get 
maximum impact.  [p. 35, 38] 
 
 Insufficient attention to dissemination and post-project followup of results. 
 













 While time-consuming, direct administration of the grants is preferable to devolution.  
IDRC maintains its profile, and gets access to new institutions through direct 
administration. 
 
 Grant programmes which have a firm institutional “home” within IDRC are more likely 
to generate internal IDRC support than those that are cross-cutting. [p. 44] 








Study:    Review of the Role of IDRC in the Scholarship Fund for Palestinian  
  Refugee Women in Lebanon 
 
Author:   Gail Larose Consulting 
Date:   February 2006 




IDRC manages the Scholarship Fund for Palestinian Refugee Women.  A total of $3.3 
million was raised from multiple donors by 2005 (roughly $1 million from Canada). 
IDRC’s contribution totalling $300,000 was salary, travel and waiver of an administrative 
fee. 
 
This administrative review assessed whether IDRC should continue to manage the Fund 





 Clear:  capacity development – but not research capacity. The primary focus was 
on basic education capacity. 
 
 Reviewer’s suggested additional objectives: administrative capacity development in 
the local administering agency (UNRWA) [ p. 20, 22], and improving the influence 




 IDRC manages the scholarship fund – specifically coordinating receipt of donor 
contributions, overseeing the selection and work of the administering agency 
(UNRWA) in Lebanon, disbursing funds to that agency. 
 
 An advisory committee of Palestinian experts and UNRWA staff monitors decisions. 
 
 A Board of Governors, made up of donors, provides general oversight. 
 
 IDRC maintains an internal role on policy, selection criteria, receipt, placement and 
disbursement of funds from donors and reporting. 
 
 Control of grants: A selection committee supervised by a Board and by IDRC staff, 
and monitored by an advisory committee, administers grants.   
 
 




 IDRC’s role in defining clear, transparent selection processes has given credibility 
to the Fund, among donors and recipients. [Similar to the Central America 
economics Fund’s utilization of respected experts as referees]. 












 Utilization of an IDRC model for selection, reporting and decision-making has led to 
changes in organizational capacity within UNRWA, the local administering agency. 
 




 Ad-hoc receipt of funds from other donors has made administration and continuity 
difficult. 
 
 Relying on the administering agency for reports has not worked.  Reports are late 
and not in donor-friendly formats.  This leads to funding delays, and time for IDRC 
staff to rewrite them. 
 
o IDRC has had to advance funds to cover short-falls from other donors 
and some awardees take loans to cover the shortfalls. 
 
 
 Ambiguity about political and development results undermines sustainability of the 
Fund. 
 
o The basic objectives of the Fund have not been explained in terms 
compatible with either CIDA’s or IDRC’s mandates or priorities.  
 
o There is confusion about the primary objectives of the Fund –is it basic 
education capacity development, or an undergraduate scholarship fund?   
 
 Lack of clarity about roles and changing mandates of Canadian partners and 
disagreements with CIDA on overhead charges have hampered coordination and 
possible continuation of the IDRC role.   
 
o Initial ambiguities about the nature of the organizational relationships 
within Canada, and different interpretations of the programme in each 
organization have led to strained relations between the three Canadian 
organizations.  
 
o Foreign Affairs and IDRC see a partnership, but CIDA appears to see a 
contractual relationship to administer funds. 
  
 
 Lack of personnel continuity among Canadian partners (Foreign Affairs, CIDA, 
IDRC) have led to problems of continuity in management and organizational 
understanding of the rationale for the project. 
 
  Publicity has not been effective in explaining IDRC’s or Canada’s role in the 
project. 
